交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2022, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (1): 30-36.DOI: 10.16097/j.cnki.1009-6744.2022.01.004

• 综合交通运输体系论坛 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑资金约束的中欧班列运价与运量决策分析

张晓明1,徐芳2,江文辉1,蒋朝哲*1   

  1. 1. 西南交通大学,交通运输与物流学院,成都 610031;2. 四川旅游学院,成都 610031
  • 收稿日期:2021-09-17 修回日期:2021-10-27 接受日期:2021-10-29 出版日期:2022-02-25 发布日期:2022-02-22
  • 作者简介:张晓明(1983- ),女,河南太康人,博士生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金;教育部人文社会科学基金

Pricing and Ordering Decisions of China Railway Express Considering Capital Constraint

ZHANG Xiao-ming1 , XU Fang2 , JIANG Wen-hui1 , JIANG Chao-zhe*1   

  1. 1. School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China; 2. Sichuan Tourism University, Chengdu 610031, China
  • Received:2021-09-17 Revised:2021-10-27 Accepted:2021-10-29 Online:2022-02-25 Published:2022-02-22
  • Supported by:
    National Natural Science Foundation of China(71873111); Foundation of Humanities and Social Sciences from Ministry of Education(18YJAZH024)

摘要: 针对围绕中欧班列业务而产生的中小企业资金约束问题,本文考虑运输价格和运输服务质量双重需求特征,构建由中欧班列和国际货代公司组成的二级物流服务供应链博弈模型,分别求解无资金约束、银行融资、中欧融资及集中决策这4种情景下双方的运价决策和利润函数。以利润函数最大化为目标,探究货代公司自有资金、中欧班列运输服务质量对双方定价与融资决策影响的作用机理,验证不同融资模式选择的可行范围,并进行数值分析。研究表明:资金约束使得中欧班列运输价格升高,但相比银行融资模式,中欧融资模式能够提供更低的运输价格。中欧融资模式下,双方利润受货代公司自有资金的影响,只有当自有资金小于某临界值时,双方才会 选择该融资模式,且中欧融资模式下,供应链整体绩效高于银行融资模式。

关键词: 铁路运输, 运输定价, 博弈论, 中欧班列, 资金约束

Abstract: In view of the financial constraints of small and medium-sized enterprises for China Railway Express, this paper considers the demand characteristics of transportation price and service quality, and develops a two-echelon logistics service supply chain game model which considers China Railway Express and an international freight forwarding agent. The pricing solutions and profit functions are analyzed under four scenarios without financial constraints, with bank financing, China Railway Express financing, and centralized decision. With the goal of maximizing the profit function, this study examines the influence of the freight forwarding agent's initial funds and transportation service quality on the pricing and financing decisions for China Railway Express and the freight forwarding agent, verifies the feasible condition of different financing modes selection, and then performs numerical analysis. The research shows that capital constraints would result in an increase of the transportation price of China Railway Express; the China Railway Express financing mode can provide lower transportation price than bank financing. In the China Railway Express financing, the profits of both parties are significantly affected by the freight forwarding agent's initial funds. Only when the initial funds are less than a certain critical value, both parties would choose the mode of China Railway Express financing. The overall performance of the supply chain under China Railway Express financing is higher than the mode of bank financing.

Key words: railway transportation, transportation price, game theory, China Railway Express, constraint of capital

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