交通运输系统工程与信息

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2009, Vol. 9 ›› Issue (3): 121-127 .

• 系统工程理论与方法 • 上一篇    下一篇

城市公交管理的Stackelberg博弈模型

孙连菊1,2;高自友*1   

  1. 1 北京交通大学 轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室, 北京 100044; 2 曲阜师范大学 运筹与管理学院, 山东 日照 276826
  • 收稿日期:2008-12-02 修回日期:2009-04-13 出版日期:2009-06-25 发布日期:2009-06-25
  • 通讯作者: 高自友
  • 作者简介:孙连菊（1977-），女，山东人，讲师，博士生
  • 基金资助:

    国家重点基础研究规划项目（973计划）（2006CB705500）

Stackelberg Game Management Model of Public Transit

SUN Lian-ju 1,2;GAO Zi-you 1   

  1. 1 State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China; 2 College of Operations Research and Management, Qufu Normal University, Rizhao 276826, China
  • Received:2008-12-02 Revised:2009-04-13 Online:2009-06-25 Published:2009-06-25
  • Contact: GAO Zi-you

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被引次数

18

摘要： 公交市场上运营者之间的自由竞争往往会走入“囚徒困境”，即所达到的Nash平衡不是Pareto最优。针对此，本文引入公交管理者进行宏观调控使运营者走出困境。本文首先建立了描述管理者与运营者之间的动态调整过程的Stackelberg博弈模型。鉴于该双层模型的复杂性，文中将下层广义Nash均衡博弈模型转化成变分不等式问题，并讨论了博弈均衡解的存在性，然后给出了增广Lagrange罚函数算法及其收敛性结论，最后给出具体算例。

关键词: 公共交通, Stackelberg博弈, 间隙函数, 增广Lagrange罚函数

Abstract: The enterprises in free competition are always in Prisoner’s Dilemma, in other words, the Nash equilibrium is usually not the Pareto optimal solution. In this paper, a static non-cooperative Stackelberg game model is developed to describe the dynamic interactive adjustment process between the manager and operators, in which the manager is the leader who attempts to reach the system optimization. Then the game is transformed into a single-level optimization problem with the variational inequality, and the characters of the solutions are also discussed. The augmented Lagrange algorithm is used and its local convergent conclusion is drawn. An example is given at the last section.

Key words: public transit, Stackelberg game, gap function, augmented Lagrange penalty function

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