基于Stackelberg 博弈的停车位分配与定价

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2015, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (3): 19-24.

基于Stackelberg 博弈的停车位分配与定价

朱成娟¹，贾斌^*1，韩凌辉²

1. 北京交通大学轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室，北京100044； 2. 南洋理工大学土木与环境工程学院，新加坡639798

收稿日期:2014-12-31 修回日期:2015-03-25 出版日期:2015-06-25 发布日期:2015-06-29
作者简介:朱成娟（1981-），女，河南辉县人，博士生.
基金资助:
973计划项目（2012CB725400）；国家自然科学基金项目（71222101,71131001）；国家重点实验室自主课题（RCS2014ZT16）

Parking Space Allocation and Pricing Based on Stackelberg Game

ZHU Cheng-juan¹，JIA Bin¹，HAN Ling-hui²

1. State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China; 2. School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798, Singapore

Received:2014-12-31 Revised:2015-03-25 Online:2015-06-25 Published:2015-06-29

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

考虑到私人运营商追求运营利润最大和政府追求社会总成本最小的特性，本文构建了三层Stackelberg 博弈模型，研究当政府拥有所有的停车位时，私人运营商追求运营利润最大和政府以社会总成本最小为目标的停车位分配策略和停车费定价问题.在模型中，首先，政府决定转让多少个停车位的经营权给私人运营商，接着，根据停车位数量具体的分配情况，政府和私人运营商共同决定停车收费的价格，最后，出行者参考制定的停车位的收费价格来选择自己的出行方式和出行路径.数值算例对不同的交通管理策略进行了比较分析.

关键词: 交通运输经济, Stackelberg博弈, 停车费, 停车位经营权, 停车位分配

Abstract:

When the government owns all the parking space, three-stage Stackelberg models is introduced to solve the parking space allocation and parking pricing problem. The objective of the government is to minimize the total social cost and that of the private firm is to maximize profit. The government decides how many parking spaces management right are transferred to private firms in the first stage. Then, the government and private firms determine the parking fee at the same time based on the parking space allocation. At the final stage, travelers make their mode choice and route choice by considering the parking fees. Numerical examples are presented to compare and analyze the influence of different traffic management strategies.

Key words: transportation economy, Stackelberg game, parking fee, parking management right, parking space allocation

中图分类号:

朱成娟，贾斌，韩凌辉. 基于Stackelberg 博弈的停车位分配与定价[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2015, 15(3): 19-24.

ZHU Cheng-juan，JIA Bin，HAN Ling-hui. Parking Space Allocation and Pricing Based on Stackelberg Game[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2015, 15(3): 19-24.

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链接本文: http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/abstract/abstract18988.shtml

http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/Y2015/V15/I3/19

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