Abstract: To balance the supply and demand of taxi at airports, this paper proposes a strategy game model for taxi drivers and passengers decision-making based on the static non cooperative game theory under complete knowledge. The competition influence coefficient (CIC) is introduced in the profit function for taxi driver, and changes in driver's decision-making behavior are analyzed considering the impact of the ride-hailing services. The benefit function of passenger group is proposed to reflect the impact of different decision-making results of passenger group on drivers, and the major factors include queue length, boarding speed, traffic conditions, traffic fare, and comprehensive impact of multiple modes of transportation. Using Beijing Capital International Airport as an example for the empirical analysis, the results show that: when the two groups reach Nash equilibrium (NE) through mutual feedback, the overall supply of airport taxi is slightly higher than the demand under the average competition level of Beijing's ride-hailing services. It also shows a state of oversupply in the morning and evening peak hours, while in the early morning the demand is far greater than the supply with the closure of subway. Taxi drivers' awareness of the effects of online taxi competition can be suitably increased considering the mismatch between the daily supply and demand of airport taxis under the existing level of ride-hailing competition when it reaches NE.

Key words: integrated transportation, taxi driver decision-making, Nash equilibrium, competition with ride-hailing service, benefit function

摘要： 为有效解决机场出租车供需不均衡问题，本文基于完全信息下静态非合作博弈理论提出机场出租车司机及乘客两个群体决策的纯策略博弈模型。将网约车竞争影响引入出租车司机群体决策收益函数的构建中，探讨不同竞争强度对出租车司机群体决策结果的影响。同时，考虑排队长度、上客速率、交通状况、交通费用及多交通方式分流等因素研究乘客群体决策的收益函数，反映乘客群体不同决策结果对司机的影响。以北京首都国际机场为案例进行实证分析。结果显示：在北京市网约车行业平均竞争水平下，两群体通过互馈影响达到纳什均衡时，整体供给略高于需求，其中，早晚高峰时段机场出租车呈现供大于求的状态；地铁停运后的凌晨则需求远大于供给。针对当前网约车竞争水平下达到纳什均衡时的机场出租车每日供需不均衡现象，可以适当提高出租车司机对网约车竞争影响的认知。

关键词: 综合运输, 出租车司机决策, 纳什均衡, 网约车与出租车竞争, 收益函数