Abstract:

In this paper, game theory method was adopted to investigate the effect of introducing the online carhailing service as a new trip mode, the strategic interactive relationship between the online car-hailing service and the incumbent (taxi). The incumbent adjusts the trip cost and take different strategies to cope with the situation whether potential entrant enters (online car-hailing service) the market or not. Assumed that the users select the trip mode based on the Value of Time (VOT) function to calculate the demand equilibrium under the given demand. Based on the two-stage game model, the market equilibrium of different strategies were calculated, the profits of trip modes and the total social cost in equilibrium status were used to evaluate the effects of the strategies. Finally, a case study integrated with the practical data was put forward. The results show that, the total social cost reduces after introducing the car-hailing service to the market, although it brings down the profits of taxis. Therefore, a rational development of car-hailing service is economically feasible.

Key words: traffic engineering, demand equilibrium, market equilibrium, game theory, online car-hailing service

摘要：

运用博弈论方法探讨了网约车作为一种新的出行方式进入市场后，市场已存者(即出租车)与其的策略互动，市场已存者通过调整出行费用，从而采取不同的策略应对潜在进入者(即网约车)是否会进入市场.假定出行者根据时间价值(VOT)函数选择出行方式，求出给定需求情况下的需求均衡，并根据两阶段博弈理论求出各策略均衡下的市场均衡，利用均衡时各出行方式的利润和总社会成本评估各策略的影响.最后给出实例分析，结果显示，虽然网约车的进入会减少出租车的利润，但是社会总成本却降低了.因此，合理发展网约车是经济可行的.

关键词: 交通工程, 需求均衡, 市场均衡, 博弈论, 网约车