Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology ›› 2021, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (5): 183-189.

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Pricing and Investment Strategies for Electric Vehicle Battery Charging and Swapping

XU Su-xiu1, 2a, 2b , XIE Bing1 , QIN Wei*3 , CHENG Hui-bing1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China; 2a. Institute of Physical Internet, 2b. School of Intelligent Systems Science and Engineering, Jinan University, Zhuhai 519070, Guangdong, China; 3. School of Mechanical Engineering, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200240, China
  • Received:2021-03-25 Revised:2021-04-14 Accepted:2021-04-19 Online:2021-10-25 Published:2021-10-21
  • Supported by:
    National Key Research and Development Program of China;National Natural Science Foundation of China

电动汽车充电与换电模式定价及投资策略

徐素秀1, 2a, 2b,谢冰1,秦威*3,程会兵1   

  1. 1. 暨南大学,管理学院,广州 510632;2. 暨南大学,a. 物联网与物流工程研究院,b. 智能科学与工程学院, 广东 珠海 519070;3. 上海交通大学,机械与动力工程学院,上海 200240
  • 作者简介:徐素秀(1984- ),男,浙江台州人,教授,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家重点研发计划;国家自然科学基 金

Abstract: Considering different preferences of consumers on battery charging and swapping modes, this paper develops a tripartite game model from the perspective of electric vehicle manufacturers and a third-party investor of the battery-swapping stations. The mechanism of electricity price and investment decisions is revealed. Three decision variables are incorporated into a three-level Stackelberg model which include the investment level and two types of prices. The optimal pricing and investment strategies can then be obtained through the proposed model. The sensitivity analysis is also performed on the optimal pricing and investment strategy factors that affect the electric vehicle market demand and the battery-swapping modes. The study also investigates the impact of the cooperation mode between a manufacturer and a third-party investor of the battery-swapping stations on the optimal pricing and investment strategies. The results indicate that the cooperation of a manufacturer and a third-party investor would reduce the profit of their competitor (for example, the manufacturer of charging electric vehicles). When there is no cooperation established between a manufacturer and a third-party investor, the investment and constructions would be affected by the profit-sharing ratio of the battery-swapping mode, which causes the underinvestment or overinvestment problems.

Key words: transportation economy, pricing strategies, game theory, electric vehicles, battery-swapping mode

摘要: 考虑消费者对电动汽车充电与换电模式的不同价值偏好,以电动汽车制造商和换电站投 资商为视角,构建三方博弈决策分析模型,揭示充电、换电模式下电价与投资均衡的机理。通过 引入投资商的投资建设水平,构建由充电汽车制造商、换电汽车制造商和换电站投资商三方组成 的3级斯坦科尔伯格模型,得到电动汽车充电与换电模式的最优定价及投资策略。对影响电动汽 车市场需求、充换电模式的最优定价及最优投资水平的主要因素进行敏感性分析,探究换电汽车 制造商与投资商合作与否对换电站的投资建设水平及充电与换电模式定价的影响。研究发现, 换电汽车制造商和换电站投资商的合作能降低竞争对手(充电汽车制造商)的利润。不合作时的 投资建设水平会受到换电模式的利润分成比例影响,出现投资过低或投资过高的现象。

关键词: 交通运输经济, 定价策略, 博弈论, 电动汽车, 换电模式

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