交通运输系统工程与信息

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2023, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (1): 2-9.DOI: 10.16097/j.cnki.1009-6744.2023.01.001

• 综合交通运输体系论坛 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于货主偏好的中欧班列定价与补贴机制研究

徐菱1，徐瞳*1,2，江文辉3，肖骅2，张湘虹3   

  1. 1.西南交通大学，交通运输与物流学院，成都 611756；2.陆军勤务学院，军事物流系，重庆 401331； 3.重庆交通大学，经济与管理学院，重庆 400074
  • 收稿日期:2022-10-09 修回日期:2022-11-10 接受日期:2022-11-14 出版日期:2023-02-25 发布日期:2023-02-16
  • 作者简介:徐菱(1965- )，女，四川成都人，教授。
  • 基金资助:
    成都市重点科技支撑计划 (2021-YF09-00003- SN)；成都市科技局技术创新研发项目(2021-YF05-00173-SN)

Pricing and Subsidizing Mechanism of China Railway Express Considering Shipper's Preference

XU Ling1, XU Tong*1,2, JIANG Wen-hui3, XIAO Hua2, ZHANG Xiang-hong3   

  1. 1. School of Transportation & Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 611756, China; 2. Department of Military Logistics, Army Logistics University, Chongqing 401331, China; 3. School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China
  • Received:2022-10-09 Revised:2022-11-10 Accepted:2022-11-14 Online:2023-02-25 Published:2023-02-16
  • Supported by:
    The Key Support Plan of Science and Technology of Chengdu, China (2021-YF09-00003- SN)；Technology Innovation Research and Development Program of Chengdu Science and Technology Bureau (2021-YF05-00173-SN)

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摘要： 针对中欧班列发展过程中的补贴政策有效性问题，本文立足于高、低值货主在运输价格和运营平台服务质量偏好上的差异，考虑补贴货主运价和补贴平台公司运营成本两种补贴方式，构建由政府、运营平台和货主组成的三级博弈模型，分别求解统一定价补贴机制和差异化定价补贴机制下各主体的最优决策信息。通过对比不同情形下货主订购量、消费者剩余，以及政府补贴额 度的差异探究各补贴方式和定价补贴机制的适用范围，并结合实际进行数值分析。结果表明：在差异化定价补贴机制下，补贴运价能够比补贴运营成本给低货值货主带来更多消费者剩余；当货主的价格敏感系数低于特定临界值时，补贴既无法给政府带来补贴绩效也不能使该部分货主产生订购量，故可考虑取消该部分货主的补贴。此外还发现，当运营平台的单位运输成本满足一定条件时，采用差异化的定价补贴机制可在不降低货主订购量和消费者剩余的基础上实现“补贴退坡”效果。

关键词: 铁路运输, 差异化补贴, 博弈论, 中欧班列, 定价

Abstract: Aiming at the effectiveness of subsidy policies during the development of China Railway Express, this paper proposes a three-level game model composed of government, operating platforms, and shippers. Two subsidy methods (subsidizing shippers' freight rates or platform companies' operating costs) are included in the model based on the differences between high-value and low-value shippers in transport prices and service quality of the operating platform. The optimal decision-making information of each subject is solved under the unified or differential pricing and subsidizing mechanism. By comparing the difference in shippers' order quantity, consumer surplus, and the government subsidy amount under different circumstances, this paper probes into the application scope of each method and mechanism. The numerical analysis is performed forreal situations. The results show that under the differential pricing and subsidizing mechanism, subsidizing shippers' freight rates can bring more consumer surplus to low-value shippers than that of subsidizing operating costs. When the price sensitivity coefficient of shippers is lower than the specific critical value, the subsidy cannot bring subsidy performance to the government and enable this part of shippers to generate order quantity. The subsidy might be cancelled for these shippers. It is also found that when the unit transportation cost of operation platform meets certain conditions, the differential pricing and subsidizing mechanism can achieve the effect of "subsidy recession" and not reduce the order quantity and consumer surplus.

Key words: railway transportation, differentiated subsidy, game theory, China Railway Express, pricing

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