考虑网络外部性航运商与无车承运人竞合研究

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2019, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (3): 11-18.

考虑网络外部性航运商与无车承运人竞合研究

郭丽彬^{1, 2}，李健^*3，张文³

1. 北京化工大学信息科学与技术学院，北京 100029；2. 曲阜师范大学管理学院，山东日照 276826； 3. 北京工业大学经济管理学院北京现代制造业发展研究基地，北京 100124

收稿日期:2018-12-11 修回日期:2019-03-11 出版日期:2019-06-25 发布日期:2019-06-25
作者简介:郭丽彬(1979-)，女，山西太原人，博士生.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金/National Natural Science Foundation of China(71571010, 61432001)；北京市长城学者培养计划/ Beijing Great Wall Scholars Training Program(CIT&TCD20180305).

Co-opetition Between Ocean Carrier and Freight Forwarders with Network Externality

GUO Li-bin^{1, 2}, LI Jian³, ZHANG Wen³

1. College of Information Science & Technology, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing 100029, China; 2. School of Management, Qufu Normal University, Rizhao 276826, Shandong, China; 3. Research Base of Beijing Modern Manufacturing Development, College of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China

Received:2018-12-11 Revised:2019-03-11 Online:2019-06-25 Published:2019-06-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

构建由 1个海洋航运商和 2个无车承运人组成的上下游的合作与竞争关系，2个无车承运人有不同的市场地位.通过斯坦伯格博弈研究发现，航运商负责货源或处于领导地位的无车承运人负责货源会影响各方的均衡利润及渠道结构.分析比较了海洋航运商的整合策略和利润共享策略.结果表明，在网络外部性和无车承运人提供差异性服务时，纳什均衡是航运商负责货源且上下游整合或利润分享.

关键词: 综合交通运输, 整合, 斯坦伯格博弈, 海洋航运商, 无车承运人, 网络外部性

Abstract:

It is studied that the competition and vertical cooperation between one ocean carrier and two freight forwarders. In addition, two freight forwarders have different market positions. We observe that the ocean carrier or freight forwarders canvass for cargos, which influences the equilibrium profits and channel structures in Stackelberg game. We show the integration and sharing between the ocean carrier and freight forwarders. Comparing parties’profits with profit sharing or integration depended on network externality and product differentiation, we find that the Nash equilibrium is the ocean carrier canvasses for cargos and the integration or sharing.

Key words: integrated transportation, integration, Stackelberg game, ocean carrier, freight forwarders, network externality

中图分类号:

U695.3

郭丽彬，李健，张文. 考虑网络外部性航运商与无车承运人竞合研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(3): 11-18.

GUO Li-bin, LI Jian, ZHANG Wen. Co-opetition Between Ocean Carrier and Freight Forwarders with Network Externality[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2019, 19(3): 11-18.

导出引用管理器 EndNote|Ris|BibTeX

链接本文: http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/abstract/abstract19829.shtml

http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/Y2019/V19/I3/11

参考文献

[1] 董娜. 无车承运人的优势分析和发展建议[J]. 交通标准化, 2011(24): 87-90. [DONG N. Superiority and advice of non- car operating carrier[J]. Communications Standardization, 2011(24): 87-90.]

[2] LEE E S, SONG D W. Competition and co-operation in maritime logistics operations. handbook of ocean container transport logistics[M]. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015.

[3] BOUCHERY Y, FAZI S, FRANSOO J C. Hinterland transportation in container supply chains. In: handbook of ocean container transport logistics[M]. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015.

[4] ÁLVAREZ-SANJAIME Ó, CANTOS-SÁNCHEZ P, MONER- COLONQUES R, et al. Competition and horizontal integration in maritime freight transport[J]. Transportation Research Part E, 2013(51): 67-81.

[5] ÁLVAREZ-SANJAIME Ó, CANTOS-SÁNCHEZ P, MONER- COLONQUES R, et al. The impact on port competition of the integration of port and inland transport services[J]. Transportation Research Part B, 2015(80): 291-302.

[6] WANG F, ZHUO X P, NIU B Z, et al. Who canvasses for cargos? Incentive analysis and channel structure in a shipping supply chain[J]. Transportation Research Part B, 2017 (97): 78-101.

[7] 郭丽彬, 李健, 邢伟. 考虑散货与集装箱业务的港口竞合研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2017, 17(2): 189-196. [GUO L B, LI J, XING W. Port co- opetition research in bulk and container businesses[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2017, 17(2): 189-196.]

[8] WANG F, ZHUO X, NIU B Z. Strategic entry to regional air cargo market under joint competition of demand and promised delivery time[J]. Transportation Research Part B, 2017(104): 317-336.

[9] YI Y Y, YANG H S. Wholesale pricing and evolutionary stable strategies of retailers under network externality [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2017, 259(1): 37-47.

[10] LIU Z, LI M, KOU J. Selling information products: Sale channel selection and versioning strategy with network externality[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015(166): 1-10.

[11] DOU Y, NICULESCU M F, WU D J. Engineering optimal network effects via social media features and seeding in markets for digital goods and services[J]. Information Systems Research, 2013, 24(1): 164-185.

[1]	刘昊翔, 吴啊峰, 龙建成, 周珏. 基于列生成启发式的单线电动公交车与司机整合调度优化[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(4): 211-220.
[2]	赵旭，张汇妍，黄瑞. 节点中断与需求不确定下的港口供应链整合[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(3): 34-39.
[3]	左大杰，肖国胜，王孟云. 产业转移背景下西部运输需求的完全分解模型[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2020, 20(5): 15-20.
[4]	冯涛，彭其渊，陶思宇，陈昕梅. 站城融合模式下既有铁路车站城市功能开发体量预测研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2020, 20(5): 21-28.
[5]	叶菲菲，杨隆浩，王应明，蓝以信. 基于数据包络分析和扩展置信规则库的交通运输业环境治理成本预测[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2020, 20(3): 20-27.
[6]	周晓晔，崔瑶，何亮，马小云，王思聪. 基于地铁—货车联运的物流配送路径优化[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2020, 20(3): 111-117.
[7]	骆晨，李想，钟林峰，胡姗姗. 基于家庭属性差异的大学生出行方式选择行为研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2020, 20(3): 227-232.
[8]	诸立超，刘昭然. 托运人在不同时空下的选择行为差异揭示[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2020, 20(1): 27-32.
[9]	项昀，徐铖铖，于维杰，华雪东，王炜. 基于人口迁徙大数据的城市对外交通客运方式优势出行距离研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2020, 20(1): 241-246.
[10]	申婵，崔洪军. 基于可靠性最短路的实时定制公交线路优化研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(6): 99-104.
[11]	莫杨辉，张培林，谢羽盟. 新型城镇化与综合交通发展的互动关系计量研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(5): 13-19.
[12]	李珺，杨斌，朱小林. 混合不确定条件下绿色多式联运路径优化[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(4): 13-19.
[13]	付晓，顾宇，刘志远. 多模式公交网络中考虑定制公交的活动与出行建模[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(4): 20-27.
[14]	彭宏勤，张国伍. 新型城镇化背景下的新区交通规划理论方法探讨 ——“交通7+1论坛”第五十四次会议[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(3): 1-4.
[15]	栾鑫，程琳，俞微薇，周洁. 综合运输层次下多交通模式的耦合协调性分析[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(3): 27-33.