Abstract: The automobile service chain alliance model was formed by charging pile service providers and time-sharing car operators, under linear demand and limited rationality, the alliance price formation mechanism and alliance stability strategy were analyzed comprehensively. The results show that the contract electricity price in the alliance will be lower than the market electricity price under the decentralized situation, and the alliance has a negative impact on the marginal profit for time-sharing car operators. However, the total revenue of the participating service providers in the service chain alliance has increased, and the overall service chain can obtain excess income. Under linear demand, the automobile service chain alliance's equilibrium profits are affected by the high price sensitivity. And the deviation of profits under different decision models shows a downtrend while the price sensitivity increases. With limited rationality, the stability of the sharing car service chain alliance was related to the initial system. Besides, its stable operation is affected by the change of profits of different service providers before and after the alliance, the ability to obtain the additional deviation revenue, penalty from the alliance. A reasonable alliance cooperation reward and punishment mechanism should be established to maintain the stability of the alliance.

Key words: urban traffic, automobile sharing service chain alliance, coalitional game, evolutionary equilibrium, stability analysis

摘要： 为综合分析线性需求和有限理性下联盟形成机制及联盟稳定性策略，构建充电桩服务商 和分时租赁汽车运营商组建的共享汽车服务链联盟。结果表明：组建共享汽车服务链联盟，合约 电价低于分散情况下的市场电价，对分时租赁汽车运营商边际利润产生不利影响，但服务链联盟 中各参与服务商总收益增加，整体服务链获得超额收益。线性需求下，分时租赁汽车服务链联盟 均衡利润受到价格敏感度的高度影响，不同决策模式下的联盟收益差额随价格敏感度增大而减 少。有限理性下，共享汽车服务链联盟的稳定性与联盟系统的初始状态直接相关，同时，受到不 同服务商在联盟前、后利润变化，偏离联盟机会主义行为获益及联盟罚金取值的影响。合理的联 盟合作奖惩机制是维持联盟稳定性的必要条件。

关键词: 城市交通, 汽车共享服务链, 联盟博弈, 演化均衡, 稳定性分析