Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology ›› 2024, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (1): 149-158.DOI: 10.16097/j.cnki.1009-6744.2024.01.015

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Conflict Analysis of Electric Bicycle and Vehicle at Unsignalized Intersection Based on Game Theory

WANG Weili*, XIAO Yuqing, ZHOU Hui, ZHANG Weisi   

  1. Logistics Research Center, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China
  • Received:2023-07-09 Revised:2023-08-06 Accepted:2023-08-10 Online:2024-02-25 Published:2024-02-12
  • Supported by:
    National Natural Science Foundation of China (71904116); Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai, China (19DZ1209600)

无信控交叉口电动自行车与机动车的冲突博弈研究

王维莉*,肖雨晴,周辉,张为四   

  1. 上海海事大学,物流研究中心,上海 201306
  • 作者简介:王维莉(1987- ),女,湖北武汉人,副教授,博士
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金 (71904116);上海市科技创新行动计划(19DZ1209600)

Abstract: Electric bicycles and motor vehicles are important traffic modes in urban road system, but there may be conflicts between electric bicycles and right-turning vehicles at unsignalized intersections. Especially when traffic participants do not strictly follow the traffic priority, it greatly increases the complexity of the interaction between different road users. This paper proposes a conflict game model between the electric bicycle in through movement and a right-turning vehicle, with the objective as minimum loss incurred by traffic modes. In consideration of the subjective psychological perceptions of the electric bicycle rider and the vehicle driver, this paper introduces the value function and decision weighting function of prospect theory. The behavioral strategy evolution process of game subjects is analyzed according to the replicated dynamic equations of the evolutionary game, deriving the final stabilization strategy of the system under different conditions. The influence of different parameters on the system evolution is analyzed using the numerical simulations. The results show that the parameters related to the prospect theory affect the convergence speed of the system evolution, but do not affect the final evolutionary result. Moreover, different types of electric bicycles riders exhibit different risk preferences when making passing and yielding decisions. In addition, the increase of mutual concession loss promotes the increase and inhibits the decrease of the passing probability of electric bicycles and vehicles, while the opportunity loss plays the opposite role. The theoretical model proposed in this paper can be used to reveal the decision-making evolution rule of road users in conflict behavior and provide theoretical basis for urban traffic management and control.

Key words: urban traffic, traffic conflict, evolutionary game theory, electric bicycle, prospect theory

摘要: 电动自行车骑行人与机动车驾驶人是城市道路交通系统的重要参与主体,在无信控交叉口电动自行车和右转机动车可能产生冲突。尤其当交通参与者不严格遵守通行优先权时,极大增加了参与主体交互的复杂性。本文以各交通主体的损失最小为目标,构建直行电动自行车与右转机动车的冲突博弈模型。在考虑两车驾驶人主观心理感知的前提下,引入前景理论价值函数和决策权重函数;根据演化博弈的复制动态方程分析博弈主体行为策略演化过程,得出不同条件下系统的最终稳定策略;利用数值仿真分析不同参数对系统演化的影响。研究结果表明,前景理论相关参数影响系统演化的收敛速度,不影响演化的最终结果;不同风格的电动自行车骑行人制定通行和让行决策时,表现出的风险偏好不同;互让损失的增加对电动自行车和机动车的通行概率起促进上升和抑制下降的作用,而机会损失的作用恰好相反。本文建立的理论模型可用于揭示道路主体在冲突行为中的决策演化规律,为我国城市交通管理控制提供理论依据。

关键词: 城市交通, 交通冲突, 演化博弈, 电动自行车, 前景理论

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