Abstract:

In order to scientifically calculate the administrative expenses and solve the problem that the equilibrium between all the participants can not be gotten by the existing method, game theory is adopted to analyze the dynamic game process between taxi company and driver, the profit function of each game path and the equilibrium conditions of each participant. By solving the optimal sub-game Nash equilibrium, the calculation method for administrative expenses range is developed. Furthermore, taking Xi’an taxi as an example to prove the validity of computational method, the fundamental basis for decision making of administrative expenses calculation of city taxi is presented. The studies indicate that the realization condition of interest maximum for each participant is whether they choice the beneficial strategy with greater probability. The administrative expenses calculation from the perspective of interest game can achieve both income balance and alleviate conflicts of interest. The reasonable range for Xi'an is 4 022–5 840 yuan/(month ⋅ veh), that is, there exists an intense interest conflict of 72% of taxi. This conclusion is consistent with the actual, and further verifies the credibility of the calculation method.

Key words: traffic engineering, administrative expense calculation, dynamic game of complete information, city taxi, interest game, sub-game Nash equilibrium

摘要：

为科学测算城市出租车管理费，解决现有测算方法难以体现各方利益均衡的 难题，运用博弈理论，解析出租车公司与司机的动态博弈过程，明确各博弈路径的收益函 数和各主体的博弈均衡条件，通过求解最优子博弈纳什均衡，给出管理费合理范围的测 算方法，并以西安市为例进行实证检验，为城市出租车管理费测算提供基础性决策依据. 研究表明，出租车运营各主体收益最大得以实现的条件是对方是否能以更大概率选择对 自身有利的策略，从利益博弈视角测算管理费能实现双方收益均衡，缓解利益冲突.西安 市的合理范围为4 022–5 840 元/（月·车），即现实中有72%的出租车利益冲突激烈，这与 实际相符，说明该方法可信.

关键词: 交通工程, 管理费测算, 完全信息动态博弈, 城市出租车, 利益博弈, 子博弈纳 什均衡