Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology ›› 2015, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (5): 10-15.

Previous Articles     Next Articles

Price Strategy for CRH Express and Traditional Express Based on Stackelberg Game Model

DUAN Hua-wei1,2 , YAN Yu-song1   

  1. 1. School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China; 2. Tianfu College, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 610081, China
  • Received:2015-04-09 Revised:2015-06-23 Online:2015-10-25 Published:2015-10-28

高铁快递与传统快递合作定价的 Stackelberg 博弈模型

段华薇1,2,严余松*1   

  1. 1. 西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,成都610031;2. 西南财经大学天府学院,成都610081
  • 作者简介:段华薇(1983-),女,讲师,博士生.
  • 基金资助:

    四川省教育厅科研项目(14ZB0451).

Abstract:

In order to gain the optimal price strategy for CRH express and traditional express, and analyze the impact of dominance and uncertain demand on the price strategy, the Stackelberg game models between CRH express and traditional express considering different dominance under different uncertain demand are established. The optimal strategies for CRH express and traditional express in different cases are obtained by solving the models. The results reveal that: decentralized decision- making lead to a drop in profits; CRH express can get greater profits when it has the dominance; the traditional express always gets more profits than traditional express from cooperation; the increasing of randomness of market demand results in lower profits.

Key words: transportation economy, price strategy, Stackelberg game model, CRH express, traditional express uncertain demand

摘要:

为得出传统快递与高铁快递合作的最优定价策略,分析主导权及市场需求波动对其影响,根据双方构成供应链的特点,基于两种随机市场需求函数分别构建了高铁快递和传统快递主导下的Stackelberg 博弈模型,分别得到高铁快递的最优协议运价策略和传统快递的最优协议运量和市场运价策略,通过算例验证了模型的有效性.得到结论,决策权的分散导致总利润降低;高铁快递掌握主导权可以增加自身利润和供应链总利润;传统快递在合作中获得利润大于高铁快递获得利润,但不一定大于其非合作时的利润;市场需求波动增大,会导致双方的利润大幅降低.

关键词: 交通运输经济, 最优定价策略, Stackelberg博弈, 高铁快递, 传统快递, 随机需求

CLC Number: