关键词: 高速公路, 业主, 代建人, 设租行为, 寻租行为, 委托代理理论

Abstract: To restrain rent-creating and rent-seeking behavior in the field of expressway construction, the connotation of expressway agent construction mode, the basic logics of rent-seeking theory, and the principal-agent theory in information economics are introduced. The paper develops the tripartite decision-making model with rent-creating and rent-seeking behavior of agent construction participant. It also documents mechanism model with the influence of rent-creating and rent-seeking behavior on agent construction participant. Analysis results show that condition of rent-seeking behavior of owner has no relationship with the rent-creating benefit, namely, the rent-seeking cost of construction-agent. The governmental supervision department can decrease expected benefit of rent-seeking and rent-creating of owner and construction-agent by enlargement of supervision strength and punishment strength. From the point of view of construction-agent, the rent-creating behavior of owner influences the deputy cost and causes decrease of expected benefit of construction-agent and owner, which cannot influence the optimal sharing coefficient of construction-agent to investment surplus.

Key words: expressway, owner, construction-agent, rent-creating behavior, rent-seeking behavior, principal-agent theory