交通运输系统工程与信息

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2023, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (1): 17-29.DOI: 10.16097/j.cnki.1009-6744.2023.01.003

• 综合交通运输体系论坛 • 上一篇    下一篇

政府环境规制下港航系统减排演化博弈研究

李晓东a,b，匡海波*a,c，何鸿宇a   

  1. 大连海事大学，a.综合交通运输协同创新中心；b.交通运输工程学院；c.航运经济与管理学院，辽宁 大连 116026
  • 收稿日期:2022-08-17 修回日期:2022-10-18 接受日期:2022-11-11 出版日期:2023-02-25 发布日期:2023-02-16
  • 作者简介:李晓东(1992- )，男，河南郑州人，博士生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家重点研发计划 (2019YFB1600400)；国家自然科学基 金重点项目 (71831002)；国家自然科学基金(72174035)。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Port and Shipping System Emission Reduction Under Government Regulation

LI Xiao-donga,b, KUANG Hai-bo*a,c, HE Hong-yua   

  1. a. Collaborative Innovation Center for Transport Studies; b. Transportation Engineering College; c. College of Shipping Economy and Management, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, Liaoning, China
  • Received:2022-08-17 Revised:2022-10-18 Accepted:2022-11-11 Online:2023-02-25 Published:2023-02-16
  • Supported by:
    National Key Research and Development Program of China (2019YFB1600400)；Key Program of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71831002)；National Natural Science Foundation of China (72174035)。

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摘要： 针对碳达峰目标下我国港航系统的减排问题，通过构建地方政府、港口和航运公司三方主体参与的港航系统环境规制演化博弈模型，系统分析三方主体的策略选择过程与整体演化稳定性，阐明港航系统内各主体演化趋势的驱动机理。并通过数值仿真分析，讨论三方主体初始策略和地方政府不同奖惩监管机制下港航系统的策略选择。研究结果表明，地方政府主动监管策略的选择与港口和航运公司的低积极减排意愿有关；港口和航运公司积极减排策略的演化速率与彼此的意愿成正比；地方政府在静态奖惩监管机制下，对惩罚强度的调整不影响港口和航运公司的积极减排策略，但低补贴强度会导致两者的消极减排；静态监管机制下，地方政府仅有(高补贴， 无惩罚)的单一策略可以使港口和航运公司达成(积极减排、积极减排)的演化均衡；动态监管机制下，地方政府采取(低动态补贴，高静态惩罚)的混合监管策略能够以低成本实现港航系统积极减排策略的演化均衡。

关键词: 水路运输, 政府环境规制, 演化博弈, 港航系统, 演化稳定策略

Abstract: This paper focuses on the emission reduction problem in China's port and shipping system and proposes a game model with environmental regulation evolutions. The model includes the subjects of local governments, ports, and shipping companies. The study analyzes the strategy selection process and overall evolutionary stability of the three subjects and clarifies the driving mechanism of the evolutionary trend for each subject in the port and shipping system. Based on the numerical simulation analysis, the paper discusses the initial strategy of the three subjects and the strategy choice of the port and shipping system under different incentive and punishment mechanisms of local government. The results show that: (1) The active supervision strategy of local governments is related to the low willingness of ports and shipping companies to actively reduce emissions. (2) The evolution rate of active emission reduction strategies of ports and shipping companies corresponds directly to their mitigation intentions. (3) Under the static incentive and punishment mechanism, the penalty intensity of the local government does not affect the positive emission reduction strategies of ports and shipping companies. Still, it leads to their negative emission reduction if local governments adopt low subsidy measures. (4) Local governments have only a single strategy (high subsidies, no penalties) to enable ports and shipping companies to reach an evolutionary equilibrium (active emission reduction, aggressive emission reduction) under the static incentive and punishment mechanism. (5) Under the dynamic incentive and punishment mechanism, local governments adopt a hybrid regulatory strategy (low dynamic subsidy, high static penalty) to achieve the evolutionary equilibrium of active emission reduction strategies for port and shipping systems with low cost.

Key words: waterway transportation, government environmental regulation, evolutionary game, port and shipping systems, evolutionary stable strategy

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