不同主体最后一公里配送服务选择均衡问题

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2016, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (3): 174-180.

不同主体最后一公里配送服务选择均衡问题

陈义友，张锦*，曾倩

西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院，成都610031

收稿日期:2015-11-09 修回日期:2015-12-20 出版日期:2016-06-25 发布日期:2016-06-27
作者简介:陈义友(1989-)，男，广东汕头人，博士生.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金/National Natural Science Foundation of China（41501123）.

Equilibrium Problem of Last-mile Delivery Service Choice Based on Different Interest Participants

CHEN Yi-you, ZHANG Jin, ZENG Qian

School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China

Received:2015-11-09 Revised:2015-12-20 Online:2016-06-25 Published:2016-06-27

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为刻画顾客和企业在选择自提服务和送货上门服务的差异性，研究了不同主体最后一公里配送服务选择均衡问题.将自提点和送货上门模拟成M/M/1/1和M/D/1排队系统，从顾客期望效用和企业期望利润最大化角度出发，分别构建了有限理性顾客和完全理性企业的配送服务选择均衡模型.基于博弈论，分别证明了最后一公里配送服务系统存在Logit 均衡和Wardrop 均衡，且均衡唯一.数值试验验证了模型的正确性，揭示顾客和企业在配送服务选择上存在较大差距，且运费和顾客有限理性程度是影响均衡、顾客效用及企业利润的重要因素.

关键词: 物流工程, 最后一公里配送服务选择, 不同主体, Logit均衡, Wardrop均衡, 排队

Abstract:

To model the tradeoff between the customer and the enterprise in the choice of pick-up service and home delivery service, the equilibrium problem of last-mile delivery service choice based on different interest participants is studied. The pick-up point is modeled as an M/M/1/1 queue and home delivery as an M/D/1 queue. From an expectation utility- maximizing customer’s perspective and an expectation profitmaximizing enterprise’s perspective, delivery service choice equilibrium models of boundedly rational customers and full rational enterprises are respectively constructed. Based on game theory, the existence and uniqueness of Logit equilibrium and Wardrop equilibrium in last- mile delivery service system are proved. Numerical experiments verify the correctness of the model, and reveal that there is a big gap between the customer and the enterprise, when they select delivery service. The charge and level of customer bounded rationality affect the equilibrium, customer’s utility and enterprise’s profit significantly.

Key words: logistics engineering, last-mile delivery service choice, different interest participants, Logit equilibrium;Wardrop equilibrium, queueing

中图分类号:

陈义友，张锦，曾倩. 不同主体最后一公里配送服务选择均衡问题[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2016, 16(3): 174-180.

CHEN Yi-you, ZHANG Jin, ZENG Qian. Equilibrium Problem of Last-mile Delivery Service Choice Based on Different Interest Participants[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2016, 16(3): 174-180.

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