双积分政策下新能源汽车异质制造商竞争演变分析

doi:10.16097/j.cnki.1009-6744.2024.06.004

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 新时代下发展新能源汽车是推进我国交通领域节能减排的重大举措，本文基于考虑市场份额因素的古诺演化模型研究双积分政策下新能源汽车制造商市场竞争博弈，并提出建议。研究发现：双积分交易退场的必要条件是燃油车制造商内部积分均衡，随着最终燃油车制造商负积分清零目标的实现，双积分政策将正式退场；根据积分交易生命周期划分，积分交易初期更有利于促进劣势新能源汽车制造商的市场竞争优势，新能源汽车市场将出现“劣币驱逐良币”现象，低质量产品充斥市场，导致市场调节机制失灵；随着燃油车制造商转型加入，双积分政策促进新能源汽车市场增长的边际作用降低，市场竞争格局将依据所有新能源汽车制造商竞争力差异重新划分，并趋于稳态；双积分市场周期演变对新能源汽车制造商的影响，从上半场冲抵生产成本的正面效应转化为下半场限制产能增长的负面效应，而对燃油车制造商，则由前期的削弱竞争优势演变至后期的促进转型发展。最终，积分政策红利消失将促使各新能源汽车制造商注重生产技术的创新，提升企业核心竞争力和管理优势，促进交通运输业的新质发展。

关键词: 交通运输经济, 竞争演变, 博弈, 新能源汽车, 双积分政策

Abstract: Developing new energy vehicles in the current era is a crucial step toward enhancing energy conservation and reducing emissions in China's transportation sector. This paper employs a Cournot evolutionary model that takes market share into account to analyze the competitive dynamics among new energy vehicle manufacturers under the dual-credit policy, offering recommendations based on the findings. The study identifies several key points: first, the necessary condition for halting dual-credit trading is the internal credit balance among internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle manufacturers. The dual-credit policy will officially conclude once the goal of eliminating negative credits for ICE manufacturers is realized. Second, during the initial phase of credit trading, the policy tends to favor less competitive new energy vehicle manufacturers, resulting in a "bad money drives out good" phenomenon, where low-quality products dominate the market and lead to regulatory failures. As ICE manufacturers enter the market, the marginal effect of the dual-credit policy on promoting the growth of the new energy vehicle market diminishes, and the competitive landscape stabilizes based on the varying levels of competitiveness among all manufacturers. Third, the cyclical evolution of the dual-credit market influences new energy vehicle manufacturers, transitioning from a positive impact that offsets production costs in the early phase to a negative impact that constrains capacity growth in the later phase. For ICE manufacturers, the policy shifts from initially undermining their competitive advantage to later promoting their transformation and development. Ultimately, the disappearance of bonus from the credit policy will compel new energy vehicle manufacturers to prioritize technological innovation, thereby enhancing their core competitiveness and management capabilities, and fostering high-quality development within the transportation sector.

Key words: transportation economy, competitive evolution, game, new energy vehicle, dual-credit policy

中图分类号:

冯琳, 蔡江浪, 贾鹏. 双积分政策下新能源汽车异质制造商竞争演变分析[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2024, 24(6): 30-46.

FENGLin, CAI Jianglang, JIA Peng. Competitive Dynamics Among Heterogeneous New Energy Vehicle Manufacturers Under Dual-credit Policy[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2024, 24(6): 30-46.

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链接本文: http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/10.16097/j.cnki.1009-6744.2024.06.004

http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/Y2024/V24/I6/30

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