Abstract: To effectively optimize the inter-airport route network and realize the proper functions of each airport in the airport system, this study aims to achieve the optimal match between airport subsidy policies and the required route network by investigating the relationship between airport subsidy policies and airline route adjustments. The game relationship among passengers, airlines, and airports is analyzed from the perspective of coordinated development of airport and a two-layer game model is developed. In the upper level of the model, an experience-weighted attraction model (EWA) is introduced to analyze the relationship between airline pricing strategies and passenger "escape" to determine the optimal pricing strategy for airlines. In the lower level of the model, the upper model results are used, and an asymmetric random response (QRE) equilibrium model is introduced to analyze the relationship between airport subsidies and airline route adjustments, and to determine the optimal subsidy policy for airports. The results show that: (1) The key factor that affect passengers travel behavior choices of is travel cost, which results in the effect of ticket price discounts exists a high sensitivity zone, an inert zone, and an ineffective zone. By improving ground transportation within airport clusters and controlling travel costs for passengers, it is possible to effectively guide passenger flows between airport clusters. (2) There are multiple peaks in the profits of the game between airlines and passengers, and the optimal discount interval is concentrated between 0.4 and 0.9, depending on the travel costs of passengers and the initial ticket prices. (3) Optimizing the airline network by providing subsidies within airport clusters leads to different efficiency levels of subsidy strategies between airports, including monopolistic, inefficient, and optimal collaborative intervals. (4) Integrating the dual factors of passenger travel choices and inter-airport collaborative subsidies can effectively enhance the profitability of airlines, promote the complementarity of airline routes within airport clusters, and effectively achieve coordinated development between airports.

Key words: air transportation, subsidy strategy, evolutionary game, route network, airport cluster

摘要： 为有效优化机场间航线网络，实现机场群中各机场功能定位，通过研究机场补贴策略与航空公司航线调整关系，旨在实现机场补贴策略与所需航线网络间的最佳匹配。从机场功能协同发展视角分析旅客、航空公司及机场间的博弈关系并构建双层博弈模型。在上层博弈模型中，引入经验加权吸引力模型(EWA)分析航空公司定价策略与旅客“渗流”关系，以便确定航空公司最佳定价策略。在下层博弈模型中，使用上层模型结果并引入非对称的随机反应(QRE)均衡模型，分析机场补贴与航空公司航线调整的关系，确定机场最佳补贴策略。结果表明：影响机场群内旅客出行行为选择关键因素是出行成本，该成本使航空公司票价折扣效果存在高敏感区、惰性区和无效区，通过完善机场群内地面交通，控制旅客出行成本，可有效引导机场群间旅客流动；航空公司定价与旅客出行选择博弈的收益存在多个峰值点，需根据旅客出行成本和初始票价确定票价折扣，最佳折扣区间集中在0.4～0.9；采用补贴优化航线网络，机场间不同补贴策略效能存在垄断区间、低效区间和最佳协同区间；融合旅客出行选择和机场间协同补贴的双重因素可有效提升航空公司盈利能力，推动航空公司提升机场群中航线的互补性，有效实现机场间协同发展。

关键词: 航空运输, 补贴策略, 演化博弈, 航线网络, 机场群