Abstract:

As the unique city to conduct private car license plate auction in China, Shanghai gains rich experiences and great demonstration effects in regulation practice. After this policy has run for decades, the auction price climbs extremely high and more people tend to use nonlocal plates, which results in a decline policy performance. This paper first points out the reason for efficiency loss lies in the wide gap between relative travel rights and relative owning cost relating to local and nonlocal licenses. Second, with game analysis, it analyzes the coupling effects of congestion charge as a comprehensive and supplementary policy to plate auction. The result indicates that if the congestion charge objects focus on those using nonlocal licenses, people with high time value usually commute earlier to avoid the charge, while those with low time value remain on the road. Finally, sequential game analysis shows that under such policy coupling background of plate auction and congestion charging, the choices of local licenses will finally increase and new congestion will appear. A feasible measure should be setting up different charge rates to local and nonlocal licenses.

Key words: urban traffic, regulation performance, sequential game, private car license plate auction, congestion charge

摘要：

作为中国唯一实施私车牌照拍卖的城市，上海的先行实践和示范效应十分巨大.政策实施二十余年来，随着本地牌照拍卖价格不断走高，选择外地牌照的人数逐渐增加，政策绩效面临衰减的局面.本文以博弈论为工具，分析了牌照拍卖政策绩效流失的根源，研究了拥挤收费作为综合配套政策的可能效果.研究发现，如果对外地牌照拥车者征收拥挤费，高时间价值者会提前出行以规避收费，而低时间价值者留在道路上.进一步，在序贯博弈下，更多的人会选择本地牌照，道路拥挤仍旧不可避免.因此，一个可行的拥挤收费方案是，通过设置不同费率对不同牌照实施差别化收费，以弥补当前政策下相对通行权不对等问题.

关键词: 城市交通, 管制绩效, 序贯博弈, 私车牌照拍卖, 拥挤收费