Abstract:

The operation of rail- road intermodal transportation is an energy- efficient transportation mode that is essentially developing in our country. From a systematic point of view, this paper constructs a tripartite game model between the government and road- rail transport companies. There exist 7 equilibrium points for the road- rail intermodal transportation system to satisfy the stability conditions through the game stability analysis. A numerical simulation is conducted to study the evolution of the ideal strategy set for its internal mechanism of each subject in the road- rail combined transport system. The evolution trend of the system is analyzed with the change of the initial strategic willingness of each subject. It is found that the evolution rate of highway and railway transportation companies toward cooperative strategies is not affected by the initial willingness, and the evolution rate is accelerated as the government actively promotes the strategic willingness. Finally, the influence of government behavior on the evolution of the game is analyzed. It is found that the increase in government subsidies, supervision, and the intensity of illegal supervision will speed up the evolution of highway and railway transportation companies towards cooperative strategies. The decline in the government's image is an important factor in promoting its active policy.

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摘要：

公铁联运作为一种节能高效的运输模式亟需在我国发展。本文从系统角度出发，构建政府与公铁运输企业的三方博弈模型，通过博弈稳定性分析得到公铁联运系统满足稳定性条件的7 个均衡点。运用数值仿真研究公铁联运系统理想策略集演化路径，阐明公铁联运系统内各主体演化趋势内在机理。分析各主体初始策略意愿变化下系统的演化趋势，发现公铁运输企业向合作策略演化速率不受彼此初始意愿影响，而是随着政府积极推进策略意愿的提升而加快。最后，研究政府行为对系统博弈演化的影响，发现政府的补贴，督导考评，以及违规监管强度的增加将加快公铁运输企业向合作策略演化的速率，政府形象的下跌是促进其积极推进政策的重要因素。

关键词: 综合运输, 演化机理, 三方博弈, 公铁联运系统, 稳定性分析