关键词: 综合运输, 空铁联运, 收益共享合同, 博弈模型, 逆向归纳法

Abstract: The ideal revenue distribution is important to promote the deep cooperation between air transport and highspeed rail transport. Given the actual situation of air- rail intermodal transport, this paper considered passengers' sensitivity to the service level, the price, and other critical factors. The paper examined whether the revenue- sharing contract can set incentives, coordinate the conflict of interest between air transport and high-speed rail transport, derive an ideal revenue distribution method, and promote the development of air-rail intermodal transport. Based on different cooperation levels, the Nash bargaining utility function was used to simulate the bargaining process, the revenuesharing game models dominated by aviation and the bargaining behavior were also established. The game models were solved by the inverse induction method. The study selected Beijing-Shijiazhuang-Guangzhou air-rail intermodal product for the numerical experiment and compared the equilibrium solutions of decentralized decision and centralized control game models to verify the effectiveness of the revenue-sharing contract. The results indicate that the model effectively improved the service level and overall profitability of the intermodal product under the revenue- sharing contract. The revenue-sharing proportion by high-speed rail is positively correlated with passengers' sensitivity to the service level. Bargaining behavior can make the service level and overall profit of the intermodal product higher and more stable, which can be applied to achieve the ideal state of the intermodal product.

Key words: integrated transportation, air-rail intermodal transport, revenue-sharing contract, game model, inverse induction method