交通运输系统工程与信息

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2021, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (2): 16-21.

所属专题： 2021年英文专栏

• 综合交通运输体系论坛 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑政府补贴决策的中欧班列竞合关系研究

张蒙蒙，许茂增*   

  1. 重庆交通大学，经济与管理学院，重庆 400074
  • 收稿日期:2021-01-23 修回日期:2021-02-08 出版日期:2021-04-25 发布日期:2021-04-25
  • 作者简介:张蒙蒙(1991- )，女，河南安阳人，博士生。
  • 基金资助:

    重庆市技术预见与制度创新项目/ The Special Project of Technology Foresight and System Innovation of Chongqing, China(cstc2020jsyj-zdxwtB0003); 重庆市社会科学规划项目/The Key Project of Social Science Foundation of Chongqing, China (2020TBWT-ZD02)。

Co-opetition Relationship Analysis of China Railway Express Considering Government Subsidy Strategy

ZHANG Meng-meng, XU Mao-zeng*   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China
  • Received:2021-01-23 Revised:2021-02-08 Online:2021-04-25 Published:2021-04-25

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摘要：

针对中欧班列国内网络节点城市间的竞争问题，本文从竞合博弈角度出发，考虑地方政府与平台公司两个层面的竞争与合作决策，地方政府作为博弈参与者根据社会福利最大目标制定对平台公司的补贴策略，平台公司在政府补贴下根据利润最大目标进行需求竞争，据此建立竞合博弈模型，对政府之间及平台公司之间的竞合关系进行博弈分析。通过比较完全竞争、平台公司主动合作、政府牵头合作3种情形下平台公司的需求、利润及社会福利，分析节点城市竞争与合作的最优策略，并进行数值分析。研究表明：政府牵头带动合作有益于地方社会福利的增加，但对平台公司来说并不是最优的；当平台公司与竞争对手主动寻求合作关系时，平台公司可以获得更高的需求与利润。数值分析结果表明，当竞争越激烈时，与政府牵头合作相比，平台公司主动寻求合作对平台公司的需求、利润及社会福利的影响更大，平台公司主动寻求合作的动力越大。本研究对于重构中欧班列生态具有参考价值。

关键词: 铁路运输, 竞争与合作, 博弈论, 中欧班列, 补贴

Abstract:

In view of the market competition between the domestic node cities in the network of the China Railway Express, this paper establishes a competition cooperation game model to analyze the competition cooperation relationship between governments and platform companies by considering the competition and cooperation decisionmaking of both local government and platform company. In the model, the local government, as one of the game participants, formulates the subsidy strategy for platform company according to the maximum goal of social welfare, and the platform company makes demand according to the maximum goal of profit under the government subsidy. The paper compares the profit and government social welfare of platform companies under three different scenarios: (i) fierce competition, (ii) platform company cooperation and (iii) government led the cooperation. The optimal strategy of competition and cooperation of node cities is analyzed with numerical examples. The results show that the government led cooperation between platform companies of two places is beneficial to the increase of local social welfare. However, such cooperation mode is not optimal for platform companies. When platform companies and competitors take the initiative to seek cooperation, platform companies can obtain higher demand and profits. Further numerical analysis shows when the competition is more intense, the government and platform companies are more motivated to cooperate. The study provides important reference for the reconstruction of China Railway Express ecology.

Key words: railway transportation, competition and cooperation, game theory, China Railway Express, subsidy

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