Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology ›› 2022, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (4): 11-22.DOI: 10.16097/j.cnki.1009-6744.2022.04.002

Previous Articles     Next Articles

Pricing Game Model of Travel Service Chain Under Social Preference View

LI Wan-ying, GUAN Hong-zhi, HAN Yan* , CAO Yang-liu   

  1. Beijing Key Laboratory of Traffic Engineering, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China
  • Received:2022-01-26 Revised:2022-05-07 Accepted:2022-05-17 Online:2022-08-25 Published:2022-08-22
  • Supported by:
    National Natural Science Foundation of China(71971005);Natural Science Foundation of Beijing, China(8202003)。

社会偏好视野下旅游出行服务链定价博弈模型

李婉莹,关宏志,韩艳*,曹杨柳   

  1. 北京工业大学,交通工程北京市重点实验室,北京 100124
  • 作者简介:李婉莹(1994- ),女,湖北武汉人,博士生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金;北京市自然科学基金

Abstract: To analyze the pricing strategy game problem from the perspective of social preference, a travel service chain alliance was constructed to compose service providers and MaaS (Mobility as a Service) platform. Three Stackelberg game models were established based on the social preference theory, i.e., the inequality-averse decision model, the altruistic decision model, and the social welfare comprehensive decision model. The results were compared with two basic decentralized and centralized decision models. The pricing strategy of travel service products and service chain profits were explored with the social preferences of decision-makers under MaaS scenarios, and the validity of the model was verified by numerical analysis. The results show that the dispersion of decision-making power leads to a decrease in the sales price of products and the overall optimal profit of the service chain. It is proved that the optimal price of the product is not affected and the overall profit of the service chain remains unchanged in the inequality-averse decision model. The overall optimal profit of the service chain increases continuously in the altruistic decision model, and the optimal decision variables are more influenced by the altruistic preference of service providers in the comprehensive social welfare decision model. It is necessary to pay attention to the inequality-averse preferences of decision-makers in the service chain and implement altruistic behaviors, which can increase the demand and overall profit of travel service products, facilitate the coordinated operation of the travel service chain, and realize the integrated development of transportation and tourism industry.

Key words: urban traffic, pricing strategy, Stackelberg game theory, travel service chain, social preference theory, mobility as a service (MaaS)

摘要: 为综合分析社会偏好理论视野下的服务链定价策略博弈问题,本文构建了服务提供商和出行即服务(Mobility as a Service, MaaS)平台组成的旅游出行服务链联盟。基于社会偏好理论建立不平等厌恶决策模式、利他决策模式和社会福利综合决策模式下的Stackelberg博弈模型,与分散决策和合作决策两种服务链基本决策模式下的博弈结果进行比较。探究MaaS环境下考虑决策者社会偏好特征的旅游出行服务产品的定价策略及服务链收益,并通过数值分析验证了模型的有效性。结果表明,决策权的分散导致旅游出行服务产品的销售价格和服务链整体最优收益降低。不平等厌恶决策模式下,产品的最优销售价格不受影响,服务链整体利润不变;利他决策模式下,服务链整体最优收益不断上升;社会福利综合决策模式下,各最优决策变量受服务提供商利他偏好的影响更大。关注服务链决策者的不平等厌恶偏好并实施利他行为,可以提高旅游出行服务产品的需求和总体收益,有利于旅游出行服务链的协调运营状态,实现交旅融合发展。

关键词: 城市交通, 定价策略, Stackelberg 博弈, 旅游出行服务链, 社会偏好理论, 出行即服务 (MaaS)

CLC Number: