Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology ›› 2005, Vol. 5 ›› Issue (1): 58-61 .

• Systems Engineering Theory and Methods • Previous Articles     Next Articles

The Models of Driver’s Response Behavior
with Game Theory under Guide Information

LU Cong-lin
  

  1. School of Humanity & Management, National Defence University of Science and Technology, Changsha 410073, China
  • Received:2004-10-09 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2005-02-01 Published:2005-02-01

诱导条件下的驾驶员反应行为的博弈模型

鲁丛林
  

  1. 国防科技大学人文与管理学院, 长沙 410073

Abstract: In the thesis, the models of driver’s response behavior with game theory under guide Information were constructed in allusion to no guide information, complete guide information, descriptive guideinformation, propositional guide information. And then the influence of driver’s
response behavior on the distribution of traffic was analyzed. It was reported in the thesis that guide information may make traffic flow to be equilibrium. The descriptive guide information will not work and may make things worse, but propositional guide information do it best to distribute traffic balanced. The best result gets from the complete guide information, Wardrop equilibrium.

Key words: guidance information, game theory, response behavior

摘要: 针对诱导系统提供无诱导信息、完全诱导信息、描述性诱导信息和建议性诱导信息四种情况的驾驶员反应行为(路径选择行为)建立了博弈论模型,分析了驾驶员反应行为对交通流的影响.研究表明,诱导信息对交通流的均衡是有效的,其中描述性诱导信息的效果不良,甚至与诱导系统的目标相反,而建议性诱导信息则有效地改善了交通流的分布,使路网系统的利用效率得到提高,完全信息则使系统达到Wardrop均衡状态.

关键词: 诱导信息, 博弈, 反应行为, 交通流, 路径选择 >