拥挤收费条件下出租车公司收益优化研究

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2014, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (1): 192-199.

拥挤收费条件下出租车公司收益优化研究

祝进城¹, 帅斌^*1, 孙朝苑²

1.西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院，成都 610031; 2. 电子科技大学经济与管理学院，成都 610054

收稿日期:2013-05-10 修回日期:2013-07-31 出版日期:2014-02-25 发布日期:2014-07-07
作者简介:祝进城(1986-)，男，四川成都人，博士生 .
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173177).

Profit Optimization of Taxi Firm When Charging Taxis with Toll in the Pricing Zone

ZHU Jin-cheng¹, SHUAI Bin¹, SUN Chao-yuan²

1. School of Transportation & Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China; 2. School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China

Received:2013-05-10 Revised:2013-07-31 Online:2014-02-25 Published:2014-07-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

研究了实施拥挤收费过程中，收费区域内的出租车也需要缴纳拥挤费条件下的出租车公司收益优化问题.考虑私家车、公交车和出租车之间的相互竞争，以及出租车搜寻顾客时间与顾客等待出租车时间对方式划分的影响.采用双层规划模型对问题进行了描述，其中，下层规划为等价于变分不等式的组合网络均衡模型；上层规划为出租车公司的收益最大化.设计了求解模型的启发式算法.算例结果表明，当出租车公司合理分担拥挤收费费用时，其收益将显著提高，并能达到实施拥挤收费之前的水平；此外，随着出租车数量的增加，出租车公司的收益将随之先增加后减小，而出租车公司的最优拥挤收费分担比例则先减小后增加.

关键词: 城市交通, 收益优化, 变分不等式, 出租车公司, 拥挤收费

Abstract:

The issue that profit optimization of taxi firm is investigated when charging taxis with toll in the pricing zone. The competition among private car, public transit and taxi is introduced and the impact of customer and taxi waiting time on mode split is taken into account. A bi-level programming is proposed, where the lower-level is a combined network equilibrium model formulated as an equivalent variational inequality program. The upper-level aims to maximize the profit of taxi firm. A heuristic algorithm is developed to solve the lower-level formulation, whereas the bi-level problem can be solved by the Genetic Algorithm. The results of numerical example indicate that the profit of taxi firm can be improved when taxi firm reasonably shares the congestion charge with taxi drivers and customers, respectively. Furthermore, as taxi fleet size grows, the profit of taxi firm initially increases and then declines, while the optimal proportion of taxi firm paying the congestion fee originally decreases with fleet size and increases later.

Key words: urban traffic, profit optimization, variational inequality, taxi firm, congestion pricing

中图分类号:

U491

祝进城, 帅斌, 孙朝苑. 拥挤收费条件下出租车公司收益优化研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2014, 14(1): 192-199.

ZHU Jin-cheng, SHUAI Bin, SUN Chao-yuan. Profit Optimization of Taxi Firm When Charging Taxis with Toll in the Pricing Zone[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2014, 14(1): 192-199.

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http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/Y2014/V14/I1/192

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