城市交通网络上个体选择行为的统计动力学特性研究

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2008, Vol. 8 ›› Issue (2): 69-74 .

城市交通网络上个体选择行为的统计动力学特性研究

吴建军^1,2 ;高自友^*1,2 ;孙会君^1,2

北京交通大学轨道交通控制与安全国家重点实验室，北京 100044；
北京交通大学交通运输学院，北京 100044

收稿日期:2007-10-16 修回日期:2007-12-03 出版日期:2008-04-25 发布日期:2008-04-25
通讯作者: 高自友
作者简介:吴建军（1973-），男，山西寿阳人，博士生.
基金资助:
国家973计划课题（2006CB705500）；国家自然科学基金（70501005）；高等学校全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项资金（200763）.

Statistical Properties of Individual Choice Behaviors on Urban Traffic Networks

WU Jian-jun ^{1, 2};GAO Zi-you ^{1, 2};SUN Hui-jun ^{1, 2}

1 State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety, Beijing Jiaotong University ,Beijing 100044, China;
2 School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China

Received:2007-10-16 Revised:2007-12-03 Online:2008-04-25 Published:2008-04-25
Contact: GAO Zi-you

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 结合复杂网络理论与城市交通网络配流方法，研究了不同网络拓扑与个体出行行为在城市交通网络上的相关动力学行为。发现对于不同的城市交通网络拓扑，用户均衡效率损失不仅是有界的，而且是有序的。进一步研究表明，无论是用户均衡还是系统最优，最小支撑树上的流量占系统总流量的比值接近一常数，且交通阻塞与流量之间存在某种共同的幂律关系。

关键词: 交通流量分配, 最小支撑树, 动力学, 复杂网络

Abstract: Many transportation processes and behaviors, from traffic flow movement to crowd stampede and natural fluxion, are related to the action of agents. We have investigated and quantified the interplay between topologies and the individual behavior modes (unselfish and selfish) in equilibrium urban traffic networks. In this paper, the unselfish and selfish behavior correspond to the system optimal (SO) and user equilibrium (UE) in the traffic assignment. A significant finding is that the fractions of flow for two cases are constants in the minimum spanning tree where a large number of transport task is shouldered. Additionally, we find that the upper bound of unselfish is limited and ordinal for different network topologies which, therefore, indicates large investment on SO is not an effective method to alleviate the traffic congestion caused by selfish behavior. Surprisingly, we report the phase transition from free traffic to congestion and derive a general scaling relationship between the congestion and the flow in arbitrary network topologies suggesting that the result may be practically useful for designing urban traffic networks.

Key words: traffic flow assignment, minimum spanning tree, dynamics, complex networks

中图分类号:

U491.1

吴建军,高自友,孙会君. 城市交通网络上个体选择行为的统计动力学特性研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2008, 8(2): 69-74 .

WU Jian-jun,GAO Zi-you,SUN Hui-jun . Statistical Properties of Individual Choice Behaviors on Urban Traffic Networks[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2008, 8(2): 69-74 .

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