考虑散货与集装箱业务的港口竞合研究

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2017, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (2): 189-196.

考虑散货与集装箱业务的港口竞合研究

郭丽彬^1，2，李健^*3，邢伟²

1. 北京化工大学信息科学与技术学院，北京100029；2. 曲阜师范大学管理学院，山东日照276826； 3. 北京工业大学经济管理学院北京现代制造业发展研究基地，北京100124

收稿日期:2016-08-02 修回日期:2016-08-26 出版日期:2017-04-25 发布日期:2017-04-25
作者简介:郭丽彬（1979-），女，山西太原人，博士生.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金/National Natural Science Foundation of China(71471101，71571010)；山东自然科学基金重点项目/Shandong Provincial Natural Science Foundation(ZR2015GZ008).

Port Co-opetition Research in Bulk and Container Businesses

GUO Li-bin ^1，2, LI Jian ³, XINGWei ²

1. College of Information Science & Technology, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing 100029, China; 2. School of Management, Qufu Normal University, Rizhao 276826, Shandong, China; 3. Research Base of Beijing Modern Manufacturing Development, College of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China

Received:2016-08-02 Revised:2016-08-26 Online:2017-04-25 Published:2017-04-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

针对同时经营散货和集装箱业务的两个港口之间的竞争与合作问题，考虑港口同时竞争、单业务合作—拥堵成本分担和单业务合作—拥堵成本共担这3 种合作模式，运用古诺博弈的方法，在考虑拥堵成本的情况下，对港口的产量、价格和利润进行了对比. 研究表明:港口之间如果只有竞争没有合作，每个港口都在追求最大的吞吐量；在市场需求稳定的情况下港口同时决策，符合某一条件时吞吐量会增加同时价格会降低；单业务合作—拥堵成本共担比成本分担的情况吞吐量更高.

关键词: 水路运输, 合作与竞争, 古诺模型, 散货和集装箱业务, 拥堵成本

Abstract:

To study port competition and cooperation in bulk and container business, we discuss the port competition, the port cooperation of cost allocation and cost sharing business cooperation. Under Cournot game scheme, we discuss the congestion cost and receive quantities and profits. Our study shows that the port enterprise achieve higher throughput only competition without cooperation. Under the stable market demand the throughput increases and the price will decrease in accordance with a certain condition. Port quantity is higher in cost sharing than the cost allocation.

Key words: waterway transportation, cooperation and competition, Cournot game, bulk and container businesses, congestion cost

中图分类号:

U651

郭丽彬，李健，邢伟. 考虑散货与集装箱业务的港口竞合研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2017, 17(2): 189-196.

GUO Li-bin, LI Jian， XINGWei. Port Co-opetition Research in Bulk and Container Businesses[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2017, 17(2): 189-196.

导出引用管理器 EndNote|Ris|BibTeX

链接本文: http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/abstract/abstract19397.shtml

http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/Y2017/V17/I2/189

参考文献

[1] SONG D W. Port Co-opetition in concept and practice[J]. Maritime Policy & Management, 2003, 30 (1): 29-44.

[2] SONG D W. The motivation for port Co-opetition: strategic implications for korea[J]. Journal Shipping and Logistics, 2004(43): 141-156.

[3] SUN Y, HE W D. A study on port cooperation in the Tianjin and Hebei areas using factor analysis[J]. Journal of Comparative International Management, 2008, 11 (2): 23-31.

[4] TALLEY WK. Port economics[M]. New York: Routledge, 2009.

[5] LUO M F, LIU L M, GAO F. Post-entry container port capacity expansion[J]. Transportation Research Part B, 2012, 46 (1): 120-138.

[6] ZHUANG W, LUO M F, FU X W. A game theory analysis of port specialization—implications to the Chinese port industry[J]. Maritime Policy & Management, 2014, 41(3): 268-287.

[7] SONG D W. Regional container port competition and Co-operation: The case of Hong Kong and south China[J]. Journal of Transport Geography, 2002, 10 (2): 99-110.

[8] ÁLVAREZ-SAN JAIME Ó, CANTOS-SÁNCHEZ P, MONER- COLONQUES R, et al. Competition and horizontal integration in maritime freight transport[J]. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2013(51): 67-81.

[9] ÁLVAREZ- SAN JAIME Ó, CANTOS- SÁNCHEZ P, MONER- COLONQUES R, et al. The impact on port competition of the integration of port and inland transport services[J]. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 2015(80): 291-302.

[10] SONG D P, LYONS A, LI D, et al. Modeling port competition from a transport chain perspective[J]. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2016(87): 75-96.

[11] BORGER B DE, DUNKERLEY F, PROOST S. Strategic investment and pricing decisions in a congested transport corridor[J]. Journal of Urban Economics, 2007, 62(2) : 294-316.

[12] ANDERSON C M, PARK Y A, CHANG Y T, et al. A game-theoretic analysis of competition among container port hubs: the case of Busan and Shanghai[J]. Maritime Policy & Management, 2008, 35(1) : 5-26.

[13] BORGER B DE, PROOST S, DENDER K V. Private port pricing and public investment in port and hinterland capacity[J]. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2008, 42 (3): 527-561.

[14] ZHANG A M. The impact of hinterland access conditions on rivalry between ports[C]. OECD Publishing, 2008(34):140-173.

[15] DUNKERLEY F, PALMA AD, PROOST S. Spatial asymmetric duopoly with an application to Brussels’airports[J]. Journal of Regional Science, 2009, 49 (3): 529-553.

[16] GKONIS K G, PSARAFTIS H N. The LNG market: a game theoretic approach to competition in LNG shipping[J]. Maritime Economics and Logistics, 2009, 11 (2): 227-246.

[17] YUEN A, BASSO L J, ZHANG A M. Effects of gateway congestion pricing on optimal road pricing and hinterland[J]. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2008, 42(3): 495-526.