关键词: 拥挤收费, 务车, 弈

Abstract: Based on the game theory, this paper explains the micro mechanism of traffic congestion and evaluates the performance of road-pricing regulations considering the composition of government-owned vehicles (GOVs) in the traffic flow. The research shows the GOVs suffer less than the private cars due to the fact that the toll of GOVs would be transferred to the administrative expenditure of the government. Under the circumstance of a great number of GOVs occupying the road, the performance of the road pricing regulations relies on the ratio of GOVs to the whole traffic flow and the time-value distribution of private cars. If the time value of GOVs is greater than or equal to the time value of private cars, road pricing could reduce traffic congestion effectively; but if the time value of GOVs is less than that of the private cars, road pricing might just add to the cost of travelers without reducing the congestion. Generally speaking, the higher the ratio of private cars with high time value and the ratio of GOVs to the whole traffic flow, the worse the regulation performance.

Key words: road pricing, government-owned vehicles, Game Theory