城市公交价格联动策略的演化博弈

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

城市公共交通政策的发展趋向于多种策略的整合，在划分城市常规公交运营主体为普通公交运营者和豪华公交运营者基础上，提出公交价格联动策略演化博弈模型，分析公交价格策略的演化趋势.模型包括两类公交价格策略实施主体、公交价格联动策略和独立策略构成的策略集合，以及采用不同策略的收益矩阵.以哈尔滨市公共交通系统为例，通过演化博弈模型数值计算结果中不同价格策略收益大小关系，证明了不同价格策略局部演化稳定点的存在性，得出公交价格策略演化路径依赖于公交运营者采用价格策略的收益水平，而且与公交运营者选择价格策略比例的初始值相关.城市公交价格联动策略演化博弈分析，对公交管理者制定公交管理制度，以及运营者选择价格策略具有重要的实践意义.

关键词: 城市交通, 公共交通, 演化博弈, 价格策略, 演化稳定策略

Abstract:

The policies of urban public transport are turning to integrate multistrategies. With classifying bus operators into two partners: normal buses and highlevel buses, an evolution game model for price integration strategy is proposed to identify the law of development of urban transport strategies. The model contains three elements: two bus operators, one price strategy set including price integration strategy and price independent strategy, and a payoff matrix presenting the revenue of using different pricing strategies. The evolution routes and the evolution stable strategy (ESS) are deduced by the numerical calculation of evolution game model. Furthermore, the numerical results of Harbin transit system of China verify that the evolution routes of pricing strategies mainly depend on operator revenue derived from pricing strategies and the ESS are determined not only by revenue but the initial ratio of bus operators using each pricing strategy. Modeling the evolution process of bus price strategies is to provide a method for carrying on the integration of public transport system.

Key words: urban traffic, public transport, evolution game, pricing strategy, evolution stable strategy

中图分类号:

U491

孙广林,王健,姜成福. 城市公交价格联动策略的演化博弈[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2013, 13(4): 164-170.

SUN Guang-lin, WANG Jian, JIANG Cheng-fu. Evolutionary Game of Urban Public Traffic Pricing Linkage Strategy[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2013, 13(4): 164-170.

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http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/Y2013/V13/I4/164

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