基于演化博弈的高速路收费通道选择研究

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2015, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (2): 29-35.

基于演化博弈的高速路收费通道选择研究

张弓亮¹，张成科^*2，曹铭¹，肖继辉³

1. 广东工业大学管理学院，广州510520；2. 广东工业大学经济与贸易学院，广州510520； 3. 东莞市道路桥梁开发建设总公司，广东，东莞511700

收稿日期:2014-11-25 修回日期:2015-03-08 出版日期:2015-04-25 发布日期:2015-04-27
作者简介:张弓亮（1984-），男，广东广州人，博士生.
基金资助:
国家自然基金（71171061）；广东省交通运输厅科技项目（502140002）.

Selection of Highway Toll Channels Based on Evolutionary Game

ZHANG Gong-liang¹，ZHANG Cheng-ke²，CAO Ming1，XIAO Ji-hui³

1. School of Management, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520, China; 2. School of Economics & Commerce, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520, China; 3. Dongguan Roads and Bridges Development & Construction Corporation, Dongguan 511700, Guangdong, China

Received:2014-11-25 Revised:2015-03-08 Online:2015-04-25 Published:2015-04-27

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

收费广场拥堵严重影响了高速路的通行效率和安全畅通.为找到驾驶员路径选择博弈的稳定策略，以更好地诱导驾驶员合理选择收费通道，提高收费站通行效率，缓解高速路收费广场拥堵问题，本文以驾驶员为研究对象，运用演化博弈的方法，通过“鹰鸽博弈”模型分析，建立收益矩阵，得到在不同成本条件下的两个演化稳定策略，并借助 MATLAB软件和仿真演化的路径分析，验证了驾驶员在选择收费通道博弈中存在均衡点的分析结果.研究表明，存在混合策略是博弈的均衡点，诱导驾驶员的策略选择向均衡点靠近，能均衡各收费通道的车流量，有效减少收费广场的拥堵现象.

关键词: 交通运输经济, 收费通道选择, 演化博弈, 驾驶员选择, 演化稳定策略

Abstract:

The congestion of toll plaza reduces the efficiency of transportation, and poses negative effects on the safety and smoothness of highway. In order to find out the stable strategy of game theory for better guiding drivers to select toll channel legitimately, and improve the efficiency of transportation and the situation of toll plaza congestion. Drivers is considered as the object of study, and the approach of evolutionary game and the analysis of "Hawk and Dove game" model are applied to obtain two evolutionary stable strategies that are under different cost conditions. By using the simulation of MATLAB software and the analysis of evolutionary path, it can be verified that there is equilibrium existing in the game when drivers choose toll channel. The result shows that mixed strategy is equilibrium of game, and to induce the strategic choices of drivers closing to the equilibrium can balance flow of each toll channel, which can efficiently relieve the congestion of the toll plazas.

Key words: transportation economy, selection of highway toll channels, evolutionary game, drivers’choices, evolutionary stable strategy

中图分类号:

U268.6

张弓亮，张成科，曹铭，肖继辉. 基于演化博弈的高速路收费通道选择研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2015, 15(2): 29-35.

ZHANG Gong-liang，ZHANG Cheng-ke，CAO Ming，XIAO Ji-hui. Selection of Highway Toll Channels Based on Evolutionary Game[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2015, 15(2): 29-35.

导出引用管理器 EndNote|Ris|BibTeX

链接本文: http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/abstract/abstract18954.shtml

http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/Y2015/V15/I2/29

参考文献

[1] Drik H.Pattern rormation,social forces,and diffusion instability in gamea with success-driven motion[J]. The European Journal B,2009,67(3):345-356.

[2] 肖海燕,刘炳全.一种基于最短路博弈分配的交通配流新算法[J].华南师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2009 (1): 34-38.[XIAO H Y,LIU B Q. A new traffic assignment algorithm based on the shortest paths and game theory[J]. Journal of South China Normal University(Natural Science Edition), 2009 (1):34-38. ]

[3] 孙晓燕, 汪秉宏. 考虑车辆间博弈行为的交通流[J]. 上海理工大学学报, 2012, 34(1): 14-17. [SUN X Y,WANG B H.The traffic flow considering games between vehicles[J]. J.University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, 2012, 34(1): 14-17.]

[4] Nash J F. Equilibrium points in n- person games[J]. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1950, 36(1): 48-49.

[5] Smith J M, Price G R. lhe logic of animal conflict[J]. Nature, 1973, 47(1): 209-221

[6] Friedman D. Evolutionary games in economics[J]. Econometrica, 1991, 59(3): 637-66.

[7] Weibull J W. Evolutionary Game Theory[M]. The MIT Press, Cambridge,Massachusetts, 1995.

[8] 李振龙.诱导条件下驾驶员路径选择行为的演化博弈分析[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2003,3(2):23-27. [LI Z L.A study of route choice behavior of drivers based on the evolutionary game under the condition of traffic flow guidance[J].Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2003,3(2):23- 27.]

[9] 王国明,李夏苗,邹华鹏.城市群道路网络上交通流的演化分析[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2014,14(2):7- 12. [WANG G M, LI X M, ZOU H P. Traffic flow evolutionary analysis of urban agglomeration road networks[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2014,14(2):7- 12.]

[10] 张波, 隽志才, 倪安宁.基于累积前景理论的动态交通流演化博弈模型[J].管理工程学报, 2014 (3): 164-173. [ZHANG B, JUAN Z C, NI A N. An evolutionary game model for the dynamic traffic flow based on cumulative prospect theory[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering /Engineering Management, 2014 (3): 164-173.]

[11] 张佃中,谭小红.收费广场内车辆排队系统的仿真研究[J].系统仿真学报, 2006,18(4):1065-1069.[ZHANG D Z,TAN X H. Simulation research of vehicles’queuing system in toll plaza[J]. Journal of System Simulation. 2006,18(4):1065-1069.]

[12] 黄武军,刘天虎,许维胜,等. N人合作博弈的Nash及演化均衡稳定策略分析[J].计算机工程与应用,2010,46 (17):11-14. [HUANG W J, LIU T H, XU W S, et al. Stable strategy analysis of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium on N-person cooperative games[J]. Computer Engineering and Applications, 2010,46(17): 11-14.]

[13] Smith J M. Evolution and the theory of games[M]. Cambridge University Press,1982. [14] Ding, et al. ESS, NIS and GIS for multi-player matrix game in single population[C]. Mathematical Methods in the Applied Sciences.2009 .

[1]	王健, 王慧, 胡晓伟, 李园园. 高峰期考虑乘客议价的网约车定价与平台收益及社会福利优化[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2022, 22(2): 54-63.
[2]	王景鹏, 祝蕊, 王鹏飞. 需求不确定下的网约车司机最优工资水平研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2022, 22(2): 178-185.
[3]	牟振华, 汪寒冰, 林本江, 陈逸群, 金程程, 陈艳艳. 基于演化博弈的违章停车动态罚金策略效用仿真评价[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2022, 22(1): 152-162.
[4]	贾富强, 李引珍, 杨信丰, 马昌喜, 代存杰. 基于演化博弈的政府鼓励条件下共享停车行为分析[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2022, 22(1): 163-170.
[5]	周小祥, 黄承锋. 农村物流末端共配联盟演化博弈及稳定性研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2022, 22(1): 265-272.
[6]	徐素秀, 谢冰, 秦威, 程会兵. 电动汽车充电与换电模式定价及投资策略[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(5): 183-189.
[7]	鲁皓, 卢鑫, 焦柳丹. 收费公路资产证券化定价及发行方法研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(4): 40-46.
[8]	王永, 谭克虎, 张娟. 基础设施公私合营模式融资影响因素及空间溢出效应研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(4): 47-53.
[9]	吴贞瑶，帅斌，左博睿. 通货膨胀下高速公路公私合营项目的收入调节研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(1): 156-161.
[10]	杨亚璪，李全森. 基于面板数据的乘用车购买偏好分析[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(1): 227-232.
[11]	彭勇，高鹤. 带时间窗的多行程交换箱甩挂路径优化[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2020, 20(1): 166-174.
[12]	卫振林，李世龙. 城市配送中心布局政府干预机制研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(5): 7-12.
[13]	梁喜，陈月. 基于客流量和车公里的城市公共交通混合财政补贴优化模型[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(3): 41-47.
[14]	李科宏，张亚东，郭进，高豪. 高铁运营安全多委托方监督演化博弈的SD分析[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(3): 103-110.
[15]	高永峰，四兵锋. 基于需求弹性的城市公交票价优化方法及实证分析[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(3): 163-168.